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2004-5 United Nations Peacekeeping

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United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

Introduction

India and Pakistan became independent countries in 1947, but the region of Kashmir was allowed to decide for itself which state to join. It acceded to India, but fighting soon broke out over the long-disputed region. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was established to mediate the dispute. A ceasefire was agreed to in July of 1949 and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established to monitor the agreement.

Fighting began again in 1971 and ended shortly thereafter, with a ceasefire line very similar to that of 1949. This left the future of UNMOGIP in question, as India maintained that it was only mandated to enforce the 1949 agreement while Pakistan claimed it still had jurisdiction. While Pakistan has continued to lodge complaints with UNMOGIP, India has ignored it since 1972 and it has not taken any significant action. Although India does provide “accommodation and administrative” support to the 45 person UN forcer, it doesn’t report any violations to the group or give it access to the Line of Control (the line of demarcation between Indian and Pakistani territory).

The Affirmative

Harms

War. In the late 1990s, both India and Pakistan declared that they had nuclear weapons and substantial tensions have arisen between the two powers in recent years. Although tensions have cooled recently, you will be able to find evidence that says that the risks of an India-Pakistan conflict are high. You should look for the following reasons in the evidence:

- Historical animosity. Historical animosity between the two will eventually compel the two sides toward conflict.

- Geographic proximity. The fact that the two countries share a long border makes it likely that border skirmishes will eventually escalate.

- Small arms fire. India and Pakistani forces have been firing at each other for years. Eventually a conflict will start. There is a recent card in the Planet Debate evidence database that says every day 10 people are killed due to gunfire in Kashmir!

- Accidental. Accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon could happen due to the lack of safety constraints in their respective nuclear arsenals

There is very strong evidence that a conventional war between the two countries will escalate to nuclear war and that that war will kill a billion people, and potentially escalate to involve China (China is an historical enemy of India and has strong ties with Pakistan).

U.S.-Pakistani relations. There is good evidence that says Pakistan supports an expanded UNMOGIP. U.S. backing of it may strengthen relations with Pakistan and there is good evidence that strong U.S. relations with Pakistan are important to the war on terrorism.

Solvency

Although the affirmative will be able to win their harms, there they will have difficult winning solvency since India hasn’t even recognized the existence of UNMOGIP since 1972! Although there isn’t much specific solvency evidence, there are a number of arguments that the affirmative may make in favor of bolstering the mission.

n Pakistan supports it. This is true. Pakistan supports UNMOGIP and has argued in favor of strengthening it, particularly in ways that operate against India’s interests.

n U.S. pressure. Perhaps the U.S. could pressure India to accept the UNMOGIP. There is a lot of evidence that says the U.S. has a lot of influence in India, though I haven’t seen any that says that we have enough influence to get them to accept the UN PKO.

n UN monitoring. The UN monitors the situation and prevents escalation.

n CBMS. There is evidence that says the mission could be strengthened to promote CBMS (confidence building measures) between the two countries.

Pakistan Press International Information Services Limited January 7, 2003, p. online

The important role that the United Nations Military Observer Mission in India and Pakistan ( UNMOGIP) is playing in promoting peace and cooperation in the region, the President stated that the positive bilateral developments yesterday, further reinforced Pakistan's proposals that UNMOGIP should be further strengthened. UNMOGIP could play an important role in support of the confidence building measures recently initiated by Pakistan and India.

The Negative

Harms Answers

Despite the fact that there are strong arguments that the affirmative can make to win a substantial risk of the harm, there are a number of arguments that the negative can make to answer the war advantage

- Empirically denied. Yes, India and Pakistan have fought a war in the past, but they haven’t since 1971! That’s over 30 years of relative peace.

- Nuclear weapons deter. In Kenneth Waltz’s 2004 edition of THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, he offers a number of reasons as to why nuclear weapons deter on the subcontinent.

- UNMOGIP solves. UNMOGIP is in place now. Any evidence that the affirmatives reads that speaks about its importance really just proves that the status quo solves.

- New peace talks solve. A new round of peace talks between India and Pakistan has been initiated. These substantially reduce tensions and make renewed fighting unlikely.

- U.S. solves. When crises between India and Pakistan have erupted in the past, the U.S. has been effective at intervening to quell those crises.

Solvency Answers

The best solvency answers are arguments about how India doesn’t recognize the mission and will ignore attempts by the U.S. to pressure it. There is even good general evidence that says India opposes all outside interference in Kashmir. As long as you extend the argument that India and Pakistan are negotiating bilaterally now, this is a unique solvency turn to the case.

Disadvantages

U.S.-Indian relations good. Since India opposes UNMOGIP, any attempt to strengthen the operation is likely to alienate India from the United States. Since U.S.-Indian relations are relatively strong now, this is a unique disadvantage.

Diplomacy trade-off. Initiating new major diplomacy in the region will likely trade-off with diplomatic initiatives in other areas.

Counterplans

Unilateral action. There is no necessary reason why the plan’s mandates have to be done under the framework of UNMOGIP. The U.S. could, for example, promoted CBMS without involving the UN. Given that India rejects UNMOGIP, this is likely to be a superior alternative.

CTBT ratification. There is good evidence that U.S. ratification of the CTBT will reduce the risk of nuclear escalation between the two countries.

Kritiks

Any kritiks of Western intervention apply here. This case is so weak on policy grounds, however, that I suggest just debating it with the policy arguments.

Conclusion

The strength of the harm area may very well tempt teams to run affirmatives in this area of the topic. A big problem with strengthening UNMOGIP, however, is that India doesn’t recognize it/hates it. Affirmatives that operate through the UNMOGIP framework are not only unlikely to solve but also are likely to do damage to any existing hope of bilateral peace between the two countries. Until I see some evidence to the contrary, I do not think this is a good affirmative area and highly recommend against it.

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