Tags: afghanistan, Afghanistan, public forum, afghanistan,

Resolved: President Obama's plan for increasing troops in Afghanistan is in the United States' best interest.  Preliminary research links, Preliminary website list

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The January Public Forum topic on the Afghanistan troop increase is one of the best Public Forum topics chosen to date.

First, it is one of the (health care being the other) hottest political topics in America.  You simply cannot turn on the TV or take a glance at Google News without hearing about the debate on the proposed Afghanistan troop increase.

Second, while there is no exact outline of what will be included in Obama's plan, the evidence below this essay provides a general outline that can be used for debate.  Basically, the plan calls for an increase in 30,000 troops to secure key areas in Afghanistan, to reduce the alienation of the population, and to set a framework for eventual withdrawal.

Third, there are strong advocates on both sides of the proposition. Some PF topics in the past have strongly favored one particular side; this one does not.

With those things in mind, this essay will discuss some of the key terms and issues, lay out arguments for both sides, suggest some more sophisticated arguments for the negative, and conclude with a couple suggestions for framing the debate.

Definitions and Conceptual Issues

The biggest definitional/conceptual issue in my mind is what does "Obama's plan" include.

By resolutional definition --"Obama's plan for increasing troops" -- we know that it at least includes increasing 30,000 troops (a "troop" is a single soldier).  But, the plan includes much more than that.  These are other things that it potentiallly includes:

- Where to station the troops

- A plan to withdraw most of the troops within three years

- A plan for getting them there within 6 months

- A plan to get 10,000 additional troops from our allies

The reason that this is important is because how the "plan" is interpreted for the purposes of debate will drive the division of ground and impact the quality of arguments each side can present.  These are some different outcomes:

- If the affirmative has to defend the entire plan, the negative can argue that part of it is bad. For example, they could argue that we should increase the number of troops by 30,000 but not pressure our allies to contribute 10,000 more.  Similarly, they could argue against a three year withdrawal time line, take issue with where the troops will be stationed, and argue for a slower rate of deployment.  The negative could simply frame their advocacy as support a troop increase, but not supporting Obama's plan.

- If the affirmative can only defend the troop increases but not the rest of the plan (three year withdrawal and 10,000 more from our allies), the negative can argue that it is bad to just increase the 30,000 troops and to not support the rest of the elements of the plan.

- If the affirmative can only defend an increase in 30,000 troops -- Obama's plan -- maybe the negative can defend increasing to 60,000 troops...In a policy debate, this "counterplan" would not be competitive (it would be better for the judge to vote for the permutation to "do both") -- but the negative may be able to win that this is a better alternative in a public forum debate that should be considered in opposition to the affirmative advocacy.

Basically, I think that depending on how "Obama's plan" is defined for the purposes of the debate (what the affirmative can and has to defend) sets up a lot of negative ground that doesn't necessarily require them to direclty clash with the general substance of the affirmative advocacy.  Affirmative teams will need to be careful to carve out a what of Obama's plan they have to and can defend when designing their affirmative cases and negatives should be flexible to offer counterproposals based on what the affirmative actually advocates.

The second conceptual/definitional issues is what it means to be in the "United States' best interest."  There are two basic ideas here.

One, it is important for both sides to ties each of their pro and con arguments back to the United States. For example, it is not enough to say that it is important to support a troop increase to reduce terrorism in Afghanistan. If the affirmative makes this argument, they have to argue that reducing terrorism is in the interests of the United States. While this is somehwat obvious if a failure to increase troops results in an increases in terrorism directed at U.S. interests, it is not so obvious if the terrorism is limited to Europe.  The affirmative will have to make that connection. Similarly, if the negative argues that increasing troops trades-off with the ability of the U.S. to deploy forces someplace else, the negative needs to argue that that troop trade-off is not in the United States' interest.

Two, more importantly, teams should be prepared to argue about whether or not something is in the best interest of the United States.  For example, affirmatives could argue that reducing terrorism is in the best interests of the United States and that while increasing the deficit (deploying more troops costs money) may go agains the interests of the United States that reducing terrorism is what is in its best interest.  Each side should certainly should have a trump card, potentially conceding that the other sides arguments deal with trade-offs that impact the interests of the United States but that only their side deals with the best interest of the U.S.

With these two broad issues in mind, I will now outline some of the major arguments for and against troop increases.  Other parts of the plan do potentially merit discussion, though it is difficult to predict at this point which side will be able to best take advantage of those arguments.

Arguments in Favor of A Troop Increase

Afghanistan stability. Currently there are not enough troops in Afghanistan to stabilize the country and stop the Taliban from overthrowing the Afghanistan government.  If the Taliban were to regain (significant) control of the country, conflict could spread into other parts of Asia, particularly Central Asia and Pakistan, and the Taliban may permit Al Qaeda terrorist groups to again use the country as a staging and training area.

Terrorism. This is an impact to Afghanistan instability, but some teams may articulate it as a distinct argument.

Drug war. More troops may be needed to fight the drug war in Afghanistan.

U.S. leadership. Abandoning Afghanistan could be seen as a signal to our allies that we are militarily weak and unable to prevail in the "war on terror."  This could generally threaten our global leadership.

Arguments Against A Troop Increase.

Loss of U.S. power. There are three basic reasons that increasing troop deployments to Afghanistan threaten U.S. power.

- Financial. Troop increases in Afghanistan cost approximately $1,000,000/soldier.  Such expenditures will increase the deficit and have the potential to threaten other domestic priorities.

- Military.  Increased military deployments in Afghanistan threaten to underminine military deployments elsewhere, risking U.S. military "overstretch."

- Political.  Both health care reform and increased Afghanistan troop commitments are being debated in Congress and advocated by Obama at the same time. Pushing for more troops could cost Obama political capital that is needed to get health care reform passed.

Failure. There are three basic reasons that increasing troop deployments to Afghanistan will fail

- Inadequate troops.  Some say as many as 600,000 troops are needed to stabilize Afghanistan.

- Alienation.  Adding more troops could alienate the populace, driving them into the hands of Al Qaeda.

- Other parts of the plan. Committing to withdrawing within three years could undermine stabilization goals.

Pakistan destabilization.  Stabilizing Afghanistan may just push radical elements into Pakistan, threatening the regime (a regime that has nuclear weapons).

Suggestions for the Affirmative

One, define "Obama's plan for increasing troops" in a way that you can defend, wholely and not just in part.

Two, pick at least one argument that is in the "best interests" of the United States and argue that the other interests argued by the negative are not the "best interests" of the U.S.

Suggestions for the Negative.

One, define "Obama's plan for increasing troops" in a way that at least makes the affirmative argue for things that are not necessarily so desirable. Argue to support other means of increasing troops that do not include those elements.

Two, pick at least one argument that is in the "best interests" of the United States and argue that the other interests argued by the Affirmative are not the "best interests" of the U.S.

Example of a card in the release:

Stabilizing Afghanistan with foreign troops is impossible

Graham E. Fuller is a former CIA station chief in Kabul and a former vice-chair of the CIA's National Intelligence Council. He is author of numerous books on the Middle East, including "The Future of Political Islam." Christian Science Monitor, December 2, 2009, Obama speech: kicking the can down the road in Afghanistan,” p. 9

Many decades ago, as a fledgling CIA officer in the field, I was naively convinced that if the facts were reported back to Washington correctly, everything else would take care of itself in policymaking. The first loss of innocence comes with the harsh recognition that "all politics are local" and that overseas realities bear only a partial relationship to foreign-policy formulation back home. So in President Obama's new policy directions for Afghanistan, what goes down in Washington politics far outweighs analyses of local conditions. I had hoped that Obama would level with the American people that the war in Afghanistan is not being won, indeed is not winnable within any practicable framework.  Obama possesses the intelligence and insight to grasp these realities. But such an admission - however accurate - would sign the political death warrant of a president to be portrayed as having snatched defeat out of the jaws of "victory." The "objective" situation in Afghanistan remains a mess. The details are well known. Senior commanders acknowledge that we are not now winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan; indeed, we never can, and certainly not at gunpoint. Most Pashtuns will never accept a US plan for Afghanistan's future. The non-Pashtuns - Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, etc. - naturally welcome any outside support in what is a virtual civil war. America has inadvertently ended up choosing sides. US forces are perceived by large numbers of Afghans as an occupying army inflicting large civilian casualties. The struggle has now leaked into Pakistan - with even higher stakes. Obama's policies would seem an unsatisfying compromise among contending arguments. Thirty thousand more troops will not turn the tide; arguably they present more American targets for attack. They will heighten traditional xenophobia against foreigners traipsing through Pashtun villages and homes. It is a fool's errand to persuade the locals in Pashtun territory that the Taliban are the enemy and the US is their friend. Whatever mixed feelings Pashtuns have toward the Taliban, they know the Taliban remain the single most important element of Pashtun political life; the Taliban will be among them long after Washington tires of this mission. The strategy of the Bush era envisioned Afghanistan as a vital imperial outpost in a post-Soviet dream world where hundreds of overseas US bases would cement US global hegemony, keeping Russia and China in check and the US on top. That world vision is gone - except to a few Washington diehards who haven't grasped the new emerging global architectures of power, economics, prestige, and influence. The Taliban will inevitably figure significantly in the governance of almost any future Afghanistan, like it or not. Future  Taliban leaders, once rid of foreign occupation, will have little incentive to support global jihadi schemes - they never really have by choice. The Taliban inherited bin Laden as a poison pill from the past when they came to power in 1996 and have learned a bitter lesson about what it means to lend state support to a prominent terrorist group. The Taliban with a voice in power will have every incentive to welcome foreign money and expertise into the country, including the Pashtun regions - as long as it is not part of a Western strategic package. An austere Islamic regime is not the ideal outcome for Afghanistan, but it is by far the most realistic. To reverse ground realities and achieve a markedly different outcome is not in the cards and will pose the same dilemma to Obama next year. Meanwhile, Pakistan will never be willing or able to solve Washington's Afghanistan dilemma. Pakistan's own stability has been brought to the very brink by US demands that it solve America's self-created problem in Afghanistan. Pakistan will eventually be forced to resolve Afghanistan itself - but only after the US has gone, and only by making a pact with Taliban forces both inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself. Washington will not accept that for now, but it will ultimately be forced to fairly soon. Maybe the Pakistanis can root out bin Laden, but meanwhile, Al Qaeda has extended its autonomous franchises around the world, and terrorists can train and plan almost anywhere in the world; they do not need Afghanistan. By now, as in so many other elements of the Global War on Terror, the US has become more part of the problem than part of the solution. We are sending troops to defend troops that themselves constitute an affront to Afghan nationalism. Only expeditious American withdrawal from Afghanistan will prevent exacerbation of the problem. Afghans must face the complex mechanics of internal struggle and reconciliation. They have done so over long periods of their history. The ultimate outcome is of greater strategic consequence to Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran, India, and others in the region than to the US. Europe and Canada have lost all stomach for this mission that is now promoted primarily in terms of "saving NATO" for future (and obsolescent) "out of area" struggles in a world in which Western strategic preferences can no longer predominate.